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author | Kenny Root <kroot@google.com> | 2013-10-14 23:08:21 +0200 |
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committer | Android Git Automerger <android-git-automerger@android.com> | 2013-10-14 23:08:21 +0200 |
commit | fc7eab961f9dc85ee88e8c37ca1dc31a7f7b8331 (patch) | |
tree | 2446fed4ef77b30039f18d7df9eae8d86a06fc1e /verifier.cpp | |
parent | am 7fdeb1f9: merge in KQS81M (diff) | |
parent | Merge "Add support for ECDSA signatures" (diff) | |
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Diffstat (limited to 'verifier.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | verifier.cpp | 230 |
1 files changed, 198 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/verifier.cpp b/verifier.cpp index 782a83863..0930fbd15 100644 --- a/verifier.cpp +++ b/verifier.cpp @@ -14,10 +14,14 @@ * limitations under the License. */ +#include "asn1_decoder.h" #include "common.h" -#include "verifier.h" #include "ui.h" +#include "verifier.h" +#include "mincrypt/dsa_sig.h" +#include "mincrypt/p256.h" +#include "mincrypt/p256_ecdsa.h" #include "mincrypt/rsa.h" #include "mincrypt/sha.h" #include "mincrypt/sha256.h" @@ -28,6 +32,78 @@ extern RecoveryUI* ui; +/* + * Simple version of PKCS#7 SignedData extraction. This extracts the + * signature OCTET STRING to be used for signature verification. + * + * For full details, see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3852.txt + * + * The PKCS#7 structure looks like: + * + * SEQUENCE (ContentInfo) + * OID (ContentType) + * [0] (content) + * SEQUENCE (SignedData) + * INTEGER (version CMSVersion) + * SET (DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers) + * SEQUENCE (EncapsulatedContentInfo) + * [0] (CertificateSet OPTIONAL) + * [1] (RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL) + * SET (SignerInfos) + * SEQUENCE (SignerInfo) + * INTEGER (CMSVersion) + * SEQUENCE (SignerIdentifier) + * SEQUENCE (DigestAlgorithmIdentifier) + * SEQUENCE (SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier) + * OCTET STRING (SignatureValue) + */ +static bool read_pkcs7(uint8_t* pkcs7_der, size_t pkcs7_der_len, uint8_t** sig_der, + size_t* sig_der_length) { + asn1_context_t* ctx = asn1_context_new(pkcs7_der, pkcs7_der_len); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return false; + } + + asn1_context_t* pkcs7_seq = asn1_sequence_get(ctx); + if (pkcs7_seq != NULL && asn1_sequence_next(pkcs7_seq)) { + asn1_context_t *signed_data_app = asn1_constructed_get(pkcs7_seq); + if (signed_data_app != NULL) { + asn1_context_t* signed_data_seq = asn1_sequence_get(signed_data_app); + if (signed_data_seq != NULL + && asn1_sequence_next(signed_data_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(signed_data_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(signed_data_seq) + && asn1_constructed_skip_all(signed_data_seq)) { + asn1_context_t *sig_set = asn1_set_get(signed_data_seq); + if (sig_set != NULL) { + asn1_context_t* sig_seq = asn1_sequence_get(sig_set); + if (sig_seq != NULL + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq) + && asn1_sequence_next(sig_seq)) { + uint8_t* sig_der_ptr; + if (asn1_octet_string_get(sig_seq, &sig_der_ptr, sig_der_length)) { + *sig_der = (uint8_t*) malloc(*sig_der_length); + if (*sig_der != NULL) { + memcpy(*sig_der, sig_der_ptr, *sig_der_length); + } + } + asn1_context_free(sig_seq); + } + asn1_context_free(sig_set); + } + asn1_context_free(signed_data_seq); + } + asn1_context_free(signed_data_app); + } + asn1_context_free(pkcs7_seq); + } + asn1_context_free(ctx); + + return *sig_der != NULL; +} + // Look for an RSA signature embedded in the .ZIP file comment given // the path to the zip. Verify it matches one of the given public // keys. @@ -79,9 +155,8 @@ int verify_file(const char* path, const Certificate* pKeys, unsigned int numKeys LOGI("comment is %d bytes; signature %d bytes from end\n", comment_size, signature_start); - if (signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE < RSANUMBYTES) { - // "signature" block isn't big enough to contain an RSA block. - LOGE("signature is too short\n"); + if (signature_start <= FOOTER_SIZE) { + LOGE("Signature start is in the footer"); fclose(f); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -187,6 +262,23 @@ int verify_file(const char* path, const Certificate* pKeys, unsigned int numKeys const uint8_t* sha1 = SHA_final(&sha1_ctx); const uint8_t* sha256 = SHA256_final(&sha256_ctx); + uint8_t* sig_der = NULL; + size_t sig_der_length = 0; + + size_t signature_size = signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE; + if (!read_pkcs7(eocd + eocd_size - signature_start, signature_size, &sig_der, + &sig_der_length)) { + LOGE("Could not find signature DER block\n"); + free(eocd); + return VERIFY_FAILURE; + } + free(eocd); + + /* + * Check to make sure at least one of the keys matches the signature. Since + * any key can match, we need to try each before determining a verification + * failure has happened. + */ for (i = 0; i < numKeys; ++i) { const uint8_t* hash; switch (pKeys[i].hash_len) { @@ -197,16 +289,46 @@ int verify_file(const char* path, const Certificate* pKeys, unsigned int numKeys // The 6 bytes is the "(signature_start) $ff $ff (comment_size)" that // the signing tool appends after the signature itself. - if (RSA_verify(pKeys[i].public_key, eocd + eocd_size - 6 - RSANUMBYTES, - RSANUMBYTES, hash, pKeys[i].hash_len)) { - LOGI("whole-file signature verified against key %d\n", i); - free(eocd); + if (pKeys[i].key_type == Certificate::RSA) { + if (sig_der_length < RSANUMBYTES) { + // "signature" block isn't big enough to contain an RSA block. + LOGI("signature is too short for RSA key %d\n", i); + continue; + } + + if (!RSA_verify(pKeys[i].rsa, sig_der, RSANUMBYTES, + hash, pKeys[i].hash_len)) { + LOGI("failed to verify against RSA key %d\n", i); + continue; + } + + LOGI("whole-file signature verified against RSA key %d\n", i); + free(sig_der); + return VERIFY_SUCCESS; + } else if (pKeys[i].key_type == Certificate::EC + && pKeys[i].hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) { + p256_int r, s; + if (!dsa_sig_unpack(sig_der, sig_der_length, &r, &s)) { + LOGI("Not a DSA signature block for EC key %d\n", i); + continue; + } + + p256_int p256_hash; + p256_from_bin(hash, &p256_hash); + if (!p256_ecdsa_verify(&(pKeys[i].ec->x), &(pKeys[i].ec->y), + &p256_hash, &r, &s)) { + LOGI("failed to verify against EC key %d\n", i); + continue; + } + + LOGI("whole-file signature verified against EC key %d\n", i); + free(sig_der); return VERIFY_SUCCESS; } else { - LOGI("failed to verify against key %d\n", i); + LOGI("Unknown key type %d\n", pKeys[i].key_type); } } - free(eocd); + free(sig_der); LOGE("failed to verify whole-file signature\n"); return VERIFY_FAILURE; } @@ -238,6 +360,7 @@ int verify_file(const char* path, const Certificate* pKeys, unsigned int numKeys // 2: 2048-bit RSA key with e=65537 and SHA-1 hash // 3: 2048-bit RSA key with e=3 and SHA-256 hash // 4: 2048-bit RSA key with e=65537 and SHA-256 hash +// 5: 256-bit EC key using the NIST P-256 curve parameters and SHA-256 hash // // Returns NULL if the file failed to parse, or if it contain zero keys. Certificate* @@ -258,28 +381,41 @@ load_keys(const char* filename, int* numKeys) { ++*numKeys; out = (Certificate*)realloc(out, *numKeys * sizeof(Certificate)); Certificate* cert = out + (*numKeys - 1); - cert->public_key = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + memset(cert, '\0', sizeof(Certificate)); char start_char; if (fscanf(f, " %c", &start_char) != 1) goto exit; if (start_char == '{') { // a version 1 key has no version specifier. - cert->public_key->exponent = 3; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 3; cert->hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; } else if (start_char == 'v') { int version; if (fscanf(f, "%d {", &version) != 1) goto exit; switch (version) { case 2: - cert->public_key->exponent = 65537; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 65537; cert->hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_SIZE; break; case 3: - cert->public_key->exponent = 3; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 3; cert->hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; break; case 4: - cert->public_key->exponent = 65537; + cert->key_type = Certificate::RSA; + cert->rsa = (RSAPublicKey*)malloc(sizeof(RSAPublicKey)); + cert->rsa->exponent = 65537; + cert->hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + break; + case 5: + cert->key_type = Certificate::EC; + cert->ec = (ECPublicKey*)calloc(1, sizeof(ECPublicKey)); cert->hash_len = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; break; default: @@ -287,23 +423,55 @@ load_keys(const char* filename, int* numKeys) { } } - RSAPublicKey* key = cert->public_key; - if (fscanf(f, " %i , 0x%x , { %u", - &(key->len), &(key->n0inv), &(key->n[0])) != 3) { - goto exit; - } - if (key->len != RSANUMWORDS) { - LOGE("key length (%d) does not match expected size\n", key->len); + if (cert->key_type == Certificate::RSA) { + RSAPublicKey* key = cert->rsa; + if (fscanf(f, " %i , 0x%x , { %u", + &(key->len), &(key->n0inv), &(key->n[0])) != 3) { + goto exit; + } + if (key->len != RSANUMWORDS) { + LOGE("key length (%d) does not match expected size\n", key->len); + goto exit; + } + for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->n[i])) != 1) goto exit; + } + if (fscanf(f, " } , { %u", &(key->rr[0])) != 1) goto exit; + for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->rr[i])) != 1) goto exit; + } + fscanf(f, " } } "); + + LOGI("read key e=%d hash=%d\n", key->exponent, cert->hash_len); + } else if (cert->key_type == Certificate::EC) { + ECPublicKey* key = cert->ec; + int key_len; + unsigned int byte; + uint8_t x_bytes[P256_NBYTES]; + uint8_t y_bytes[P256_NBYTES]; + if (fscanf(f, " %i , { %u", &key_len, &byte) != 2) goto exit; + if (key_len != P256_NBYTES) { + LOGE("Key length (%d) does not match expected size %d\n", key_len, P256_NBYTES); + goto exit; + } + x_bytes[P256_NBYTES - 1] = byte; + for (i = P256_NBYTES - 2; i >= 0; --i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &byte) != 1) goto exit; + x_bytes[i] = byte; + } + if (fscanf(f, " } , { %u", &byte) != 1) goto exit; + y_bytes[P256_NBYTES - 1] = byte; + for (i = P256_NBYTES - 2; i >= 0; --i) { + if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &byte) != 1) goto exit; + y_bytes[i] = byte; + } + fscanf(f, " } } "); + p256_from_bin(x_bytes, &key->x); + p256_from_bin(y_bytes, &key->y); + } else { + LOGE("Unknown key type %d\n", cert->key_type); goto exit; } - for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { - if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->n[i])) != 1) goto exit; - } - if (fscanf(f, " } , { %u", &(key->rr[0])) != 1) goto exit; - for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { - if (fscanf(f, " , %u", &(key->rr[i])) != 1) goto exit; - } - fscanf(f, " } } "); // if the line ends in a comma, this file has more keys. switch (fgetc(f)) { @@ -319,8 +487,6 @@ load_keys(const char* filename, int* numKeys) { LOGE("unexpected character between keys\n"); goto exit; } - - LOGI("read key e=%d hash=%d\n", key->exponent, cert->hash_len); } } |